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ICC Note: Here is a fantastic article that is learned, level headed, and clearly describes the ideological/philosophical source of Islamic violence. We have written extensively on this and will continue to post well written articles that boil down this complex issue into a compact readable package. The same philosophical underpinnings for violence (verses in the Koran and Hadith) are also present for the oppression and subjugation of other faiths living in Islamic countries. Islam is incredibly oppressive towards people of other faiths and Islam has now surpassed Communism as the great persecutor of Christians. Understanding why makes all the Islamic insanity that one reads about in the front pages easily understandable and within context.

Creed of the sword
Islam has to accept that its militants find support for violence in their faith’s teachings and should pursue reform, writes Mark Durie

For the full article, go to The Australian

THE world has witnessed a flood of reaction this week to Benedict XVI’s Regensburg lecture, a reaction that has gone well beyond words, with attacks on churches in Gaza , the West Bank and Basra , and apparently the killing of an elderly Italian nun in Mogadishu , together with her guard. Some have called for the Pope to be executed.
According to Britain ‘s Daily Mail, Anjem Choudary of the British Muslim organization al-Ghurabaa, was leading a rally outside Westminster Abbey when he asked for Catholicism’s supreme leader to be subjected to capital punishment, and Somali religious leader Abubukar Hassan Malin has declared that the Pope should be hunted down and killed “on the spot”.

Australia ‘s Cardinal George Pell weighed into the debate, suggesting that violent responses to the Pope’s September 12 lecture demonstrate the link “for the Islamists” between religion and violence.

On the other hand, no less a figure than the Grand Mufti of Saudi Arabia, Sheikh Abdel Aziz al-Sheikh, issued a statement on the official Saudi news service, defending Muslims’ divine right to resort to violence: “The spread of Islam has gone through several phases, secret and then public, in Mecca and Medina. God then authorized the faithful to defend themselves and to fight against those fighting them, which amounts to a right legitimized by God. This … is quite reasonable, and God will not hate it.”

Saudi Arabia’s most senior cleric also explained that war was never Islam’s ancient founder, the prophet Mohammed’s, first choice: “He gave three options: either accept Islam, or surrender and pay tax, and they will be allowed to remain in their land, observing their religion under the protection of Muslims.” Thus, according to the Grand Mufti, the third option of violence against non-Muslims was only a last resort, if they refused to convert or surrender peacefully to the armies of Islam.

Abdel went on to urge people to read the Koran and Sunnah (the record of Mohammed’s teaching and example) for themselves, pointing out that the Koran, Islam’s equivalent of scripture, has been translated into many of the world’s languages: “Those who read the Koran and the Sunnah can understand the facts.”

On this at least the Archbishop of Sydney and the Saudi Grand Mufti do agree, for in an address earlier this year, Pell also urged people to read the Koran.

Accessing the facts: So what are these facts contained in the Koran and Sunnah that the Grand Mufti would have us read? As it happens, reading the Koran is not without its difficulties. There is, for a start, the thorny problem of context. The Koran gives little help with this: it does not mark off specific passages one from another and its 114 chapters (suras) are not laid out in chronological order.

The keys to unlocking the context for individual passages of the Koran can be found in the life of Mohammed, the Sunnah. The sources for the Sunnah are the traditions (hadiths), of which Sunnis recognize six canonical collections, and biographies of Mohammed (sira literature). Although the volume of this material is considerable, it is now largely available in English translation, much of it on the internet.

In addition to the inherent difficulty of the sources, many secular Westerners rely on certain crippling preconceptions. One is the often-heard mantra that “all religions are the same”. Another is the claim that “anyone can justify violence from any religious text”. This idea stretches back at least to Rousseau, who considered any and all forms of religion to be pernicious.

Either of these views, if firmly held, would tend to sabotage anyone’s ability to investigate the Koran’s distinctive take on violence.

There is another obstacle, and that is Western culture’s own sense of guilt and suspicion of what it regards as Christian hypocrisy.

Any attempt to critique some of Islam’s teachings is likely to be met with loud and vociferous denunciations of the church’s moral failings, such as its appalling track record of anti-Semitism. And did I mention the crusades? Finally, the reality is that Muslims adhere to widely varying beliefs and practices. Most people are understandably afraid to come to their own conclusions about violent passages in the Koran, lest they find themselves demonizing Muslims.

But does the Koran incite violence, and how does its message compare with the Bible?

The Koran: It is self-evident that some Koranic verses encourage violence. Consider for example a verse which implies that fighting is “good for you”: “Fighting is prescribed upon you, and you dislike it. But it may happen that you dislike a thing which is good for you, and it may happen that you love a thing which is bad for you. And Allah knows and you know not.” (2:216)

On the other hand, it is equally clear that there are peaceful verses as well, including the famous “no compulsion in religion” (2:256).

Resolving apparently contradictory messages presents one of the central interpretative challenges of the Koran. Muslims do not agree today on how best to address this. For this reason alone it could be regarded as unreasonable to claim that any one interpretation of the Koran is the correct one.

Nevertheless, a consensus developed very early in the history of Islam about this problem. This method relies on a theory of stages in the development of Mohammed’s prophetic career. It also appeals to a doctrine known as abrogation, which states that verses revealed later can cancel out or qualify verses revealed earlier.

The classical approach to violence in the Koran was neatly summed up in an essay on jihad in the Koran by Sheikh Abdullah bin Muhammad bin Hamid, former chief justice of Saudi Arabia: “So at first ‘the fighting’ was forbidden, then it was permitted and after that it was made obligatory: (1) against those who start ‘the fighting’ against you (Muslims) … (2) And against all those who worship others along with Allah.”

At the beginning, in Mohammed’s Meccan period, when he was weaker and his followers few, passages of the Koran encouraged peaceful relations and avoidance of conflict: “Invite (all) to the way of your Lord with wisdom and beautiful preaching; and argue with them in ways that are best and most gracious.” (16:125)

Later, after persecution and emigration to Medina in the first year of the Islamic calendar, authority was given to engage in warfare for defensive purposes only: “Fight in the path of God those who fight you, but do not transgress limits, for God does not love transgressors.” (2:190)

As the Muslim community grew stronger and conflict with its neighbors did not abate, further revelations expanded the license for waging war, until in Sura 9, regarded as one of the last chapters to be revealed, it is concluded that war against non-Muslims could be waged more or less at any time and in any place to extend the dominance of Islam. Sura 9 distinguished idolaters, who were to be fought until they converted – “When the sacred months are past, kill the idolaters wherever you find them, and seize them, and besiege them, and lie in wait for them in every place of ambush” (Sura 9:5) – from “People of the Book” (Christians and Jews), who were to be given a further option of surrendering and living under Islamic rule while keeping their religion: “Fight … the People of the Book until they pay the poll tax out of hand, having been humbled.” (Sura 9:29)

The resulting doctrine of war was described by the great medieval philosopher Ibn Khaldun: “In the Muslim community, the holy war (jihad) is a religious duty, because of the universalism of the (Muslim) mission and the (obligation to) convert everybody to Islam either by persuasion or by force.” (The Muqaddimah)

The popular Muslim scholar Yusuf al-Qaradawi, head of the European Council for Fatwa and Research, and al-Jazeera television personality, in July 2003 invoked the classical dogma of the Dar al-Harb or “domain of war” that encompasses all the regions of the world in which Islam is not yet dominant. In the Dar al-Harb the lives and possessions of non-Muslims are muba’a, or “licit”, making them a legitimate target for military action: “It has been determined by Islamic law that the blood and property of people of Dar al-Harb is not protected … in modern war, all of society, with all its classes and ethnic groups, is mobilized to participate in the war, to aid its continuation and to provide it with the material and human fuel required for it to assure the victory of the state fighting its enemies.”

All this explains Sheikh Abdel Aziz’s response to the Pope’s speech.

Alluding to the distinction between the Meccan and Medinan periods of revelation, the Grand Mufti invoked the doctrine of Sura 9:29 (cited above), that fighting against People of the Book continues until non-Muslims convert or surrender.

Today most Muslims acknowledge the religious legitimacy of “defensive jihad” – including the Palestinian struggle – but many appear to reject the idea of offensive, expansionist jihad. Most would emphasize the defensive aspects of Mohammed’s numerous military campaigns, claiming that his attacks on others were only to pre-empt future aggression against Muslims. It is also often asserted that Mohammed’s military exploits were context-specific responses to the unique situations he encountered in his lifetime, and not binding on later generations of Muslims.

However the idea of a purely defensive jihad is hard to reconcile with the phenomenal military expansion of Islam in its first 100 years. For centuries the validity of the doctrine of expansionist jihad just seemed self-evident to Muslim scholars, as it was validated by the military victories it had delivered across the greater part of the Christian world, as well as Zoroastrian Persia and Hindu India.

The Koran’s advice on responding to persecution is very different (from the Bible). The phrase “persecution (or trial) is worse than slaughter” (2:191, 217) implies that anything that impedes the spread of Islam, or which could cause Muslims to abandon their faith, is worse than killing the persecutors.

The need for reform: Islam has not yet come to a consensus about how Muslims should conduct themselves under non-Muslim rule. There is no consensus that a just war should not be conceived in sacralised terms as a jihad.

There is no consensus that the earlier, more peaceful verses of the Koran take priority over the later, more violent ones. There is no consensus that the old program of military expansion should not be resumed if and when it becomes practical to do so. There is no consensus that non-Muslims should be allowed to discuss the Koran and the life of Mohammed without becoming the target of intimidation, and subjected to accusations of ignorance, incompetence or racism.

The Muslim world is incredibly diverse and such a consensus may never be developed. Nevertheless it must be attempted. The important work to achieve this consensus is under way, but it remains to be completed, and any debate that can hasten the development of a less sacralised approach to the use of force within Islam deserves everyone’s whole-hearted support.

Dr Mark Durie is an Anglican vicar and a fellow of the Australian Academy of the Humanities.