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(Indo Wahabbi) Radicals in retreat

ICC Note: JI is a (largely) Saudi funded radical Wahabbist fundamentalist Islamic terrorist group that was centered in Poso , Indonesia. It was largely responsible for radicalizing much of Indonesia ’s Muslims. This radicalization eventually bore fruit in the deaths of 10,000 Christians from 1998-2003 period.

(Indo Wahabbi) Radicals in retreat

Australia 's "soft" war on Jemaah Islamiah has been the unsung success story of the world's fight against terror. Mark Forbes reports.

Islam/Indonesia/Australia/Malaysia/Singapore They were meticulously planned, the fertiliser and TNT-powered blasts that ripped through Paddy's Bar, the Sari Club and the holidaymakers cavorting inside them on October 12, 2002.

The bombs left 202 burnt, bloodied bodies along the famous Kuta holiday strip, and announced in the most shocking terms that international terrorism had arrived on Australia 's doorstep.

With calculated carnage inflicted on the softest of targets, Jemaah Islamiah leapt from the shadows to become the region's primary terrorist threat.

On Afghanistan 's battlefields, JI had forged bonds with al-Qaeda, which schooled its fighters in weapons and explosives. It was bent on Islamic revolution and targeted these raucous symbols of Western decadence in a rallying call for Muslims to turn on foreigners.

For the next three years, JI struck at will, bombing the Marriott Hotel and Australia 's Jakarta Embassy before dispatching suicide bombers to Bali restaurants in 2005.

Practically undetected, JI had recruited thousands of members and established four command structures (called mantiqis) stretching across Indonesia , Singapore , Malaysia , Thailand and even Australia . It was the Perth-based mantiqi four that recruited Jack Roach — convicted for planning to bomb the Israeli Embassy in Canberra at the behest of al-Qaeda.

Authorities had underestimated the danger. Even after the Bali attack, Indonesian leaders queried JI's existence and investigators initially refused to consider an Indonesian suicide bombing.

In Bali , Australian police began an unprecedented partnership with their Indonesian counterparts, picking through the wreckage in Kuta and assembling a picture of the network behind it. Their combination of sophisticated policing, high-tech surveillance and covert "soft" approaches to win over acolytes has been the unrecognised success of the world's war on terror.

Today, Canberra still issues frantic warnings against travelling to Indonesia ; ASIO head Paul O'Sullivan recently said JI "meant business" and it and other jihadist groups posed a "significant threat to Australia 's national security".

But those tracking JI believe it has been largely neutralised as a terror threat, with its military leaders arrested or on the run.

Almost all have been apprehended by Petrus Golose, the deputy commander of Indonesia 's crack counter-terror squad, Detachment 88. It was Golose who caught JI's military commander, Abu Dujana, and new leader Zarkasih in June.

It was Golose who captured the Bali bombers. And it was Golose who, after the second Bali attacks, ordered JI's master bomb-maker Azahari Husin to be cut down by a barrage of bullets in a village hideout before he could detonate the suicide bomb strapped to his chest.

He believes the terrorists are incapable, for now, of launching fresh attacks.

"Before we were afraid of them," he says. "Now they are afraid of us. We are not saying that they are stopped, but at least they need to consolidate. To hunt them is the best strategy. That's what we are doing now, hunting them."

Before 2002, JI bombed churches across Indonesia but police knew little about the network and had no idea where the next attack would be, Golose admits.

Now JI and its offshoots have been unable to mount a major attack for almost two years, he says. The mantiqis have been abandoned and leaders of its key remaining base in Indonesia 's central Java are undergoing interrogation.

The International Crisis Group's Sidney Jones agrees that "JI has been severely weakened over the past five years in terms of geographic reach, funding, capacity and, importantly, control.

"In the near term, JI will be focused on rebuilding and remains dangerous less as a terrorist organisation in its own right than as a recruiting tool," she says.

Not that JI has conceded defeat.

Police interviews and seized documents reveal a plan to regroup and rebuild towards a 30-year goal of establishing an Islamic state, with a growing network of radical Islamic schools to nurse recruits.

JI's remaining leaders believe mass bombings — which killed more Muslims than Christians — and resulting crackdowns backfired and favour an evolutionary imposition of Islamic Sharia law.

A few fanatics, spearheaded by Bali bomb planner Noordin Top, remain dedicated to attacking civilians but are busy avoiding capture. Several hardliners have fled to the Philippines and teamed up with the Abu Sayyaf Group, but are distanced from the JI mainstream.

Following his arrest, Dujana admitted he headed JI's military wing, but claimed to oppose the Bali bombings. "Some of the perpetrators are JI members, however today they are out of control," Dujana said, adding that Top had violated JI's "rules of the game".

Golose remains sceptical, pointing out that Dujana received reports on the bombings, provided personnel and enabled Top to continue to evade capture.

It was Golose who captured the Bali bombers. And it was Golose who, after the second Bali attacks, ordered JI's master bomb-maker Azahari Husin to be cut down by a barrage of bullets in a village hideout before he could detonate the suicide bomb strapped to his chest.

He believes the terrorists are incapable, for now, of launching fresh attacks.

"Before we were afraid of them," he says. "Now they are afraid of us. We are not saying that they are stopped, but at least they need to consolidate. To hunt them is the best strategy. That's what we are doing now, hunting them."

Before 2002, JI bombed churches across Indonesia but police knew little about the network and had no idea where the next attack would be, Golose admits.

Now JI and its offshoots have been unable to mount a major attack for almost two years, he says. The mantiqis have been abandoned and leaders of its key remaining base in Indonesia 's central Java are undergoing interrogation.

The International Crisis Group's Sidney Jones agrees that "JI has been severely weakened over the past five years in terms of geographic reach, funding, capacity and, importantly, control.

"In the near term, JI will be focused on rebuilding and remains dangerous less as a terrorist organisation in its own right than as a recruiting tool," she says.

Not that JI has conceded defeat.

Police interviews and seized documents reveal a plan to regroup and rebuild towards a 30-year goal of establishing an Islamic state, with a growing network of radical Islamic schools to nurse recruits.

JI's remaining leaders believe mass bombings — which killed more Muslims than Christians — and resulting crackdowns backfired and favour an evolutionary imposition of Islamic Sharia law.

A few fanatics, spearheaded by Bali bomb planner Noordin Top, remain dedicated to attacking civilians but are busy avoiding capture. Several hardliners have fled to the Philippines and teamed up with the Abu Sayyaf Group, but are distanced from the JI mainstream.

Following his arrest, Dujana admitted he headed JI's military wing, but claimed to oppose the Bali bombings. "Some of the perpetrators are JI members, however today they are out of control," Dujana said, adding that Top had violated JI's "rules of the game".

Golose remains sceptical, pointing out that Dujana received reports on the bombings, provided personnel and enabled Top to continue to evade capture.

Foreign Minister Alexander Downer told The Sunday Age moderate Islamic leaders must be encouraged and supported. Australia is working with mass Muslim groups across Indonesia , he says.

"They are the people who are going to confront extremist Islam," Mr Downer says. "We are actually building Islamic schools in Indonesia — we're building thousands of them, 2000 of them. Why? Because Islam is a fact."

Sidney Jones says more must be done to confront fundamentalist ideology. JI was born from another hardline Islamic group that waxed and waned for 50 years, similar to several existing today. The more than 20 schools it has established and the offspring of its members are fertile recruiting grounds. In prison, members use Islamic study groups to win across other inmates.

"The ideology now has deep roots in the region and you can't say the danger is over," she says.

Although JI has lost its base in Poso — where it attempted to inspire Islamic hatred of Christians — it retains an intricate web of family, business and social ties, providing the capacity to regenerate.

JI's new leaders will be Indonesia-focused, opposed to al-Qaeda-style tactics, says Jones, but some youths may grow impatient and radicals hiding in the Philippines could return to lead them.

In one post-arrest interview, Dujana pointed out that JI could not be understood as an organisation in conventional terms. "We are underground," he said. "What is clear is, we still have friends out there. God willing, they are patient."

How Jemaah Islamiah became the region's primary terrorist threat

Established in 1993 by two hardline Indonesian clerics, Abdullah Sungkar and Abu Bakar Bashir, who had fled to Malaysia .

The group dispatched fighters to Afghanistan , building strong links with Osama bin Laden's al-Qaeda, and developed its own military training bases in Indonesia and the Philippines .

With the aim of enforcing an Islamic state across the region, Jemaah Islamiah established four command structures, or mantiqis. Mantiqi 1 covered Malaysia , Singapore and southern Thailand . Mantiqi 2 covered Indonesia . Mantiqi 3 covered the Philippines , and Indonesia 's Kalimantan and Sulawesi . Mantiqi 4 was to be responsible for Australia and West Papua .

Initially it concentrated its attacks on Christians and churches, but burst on to the international terror scene with the 2002 Bali bombing as the region's primary terrorist threat.

KEY EVENTS: Jemaah Islamiah founded.

■ 1993

December 24, 2000: Bombs sent to about 30 churches in Indonesia .

October 12, 2002. First Bali bombing.

August-September 2003. Captured Bali bombers Mukhlas, Imam Samudra and Amrozi sentenced to death.

April 30, 2004: Abu Bakar Bashir sentenced to 2½ years' jail for approving the Bali bombing (verdict overturned after his release).

September 9, 2004: Bombing of Australian Embassy, Jakarta .

October 1, 2005: Second Bali bombings.

November 9, 2005: Azahari Husin shot dead in Malang , East Java .

June 9, 2007: Abu Dujana (military commander) and Zarkasih (emir) arrested.

Dujana did admit to encouraging violence in Poso, including church bombings and the beheading of three Christian schoolgirls in 2005. As Poso was a "conflict zone" where Muslims were under attack he justified these attacks as jihad.

Revulsion at the beheadings drove a new police investigation into Poso, exposing JI's hand in the violence. Early this year, 22 sympathisers were killed when they resisted a police raid on a remote village. Others arrested revealed the location of JI's safe houses in Java. Watching them, along with monitoring phone and internet communications, led police to stockpiles of guns and hundreds of kilograms of explosives, then to Dujana and Zakarsih.

Indonesian Security Ministry counter-terrorism chief Ansyaad Mbai describes the operation as a "spectacular success, this network is the inner circle of JI".

In a swipe at those in the US and Australia who had claimed Indonesia was not tough enough against suspects and should have outlawed JI, Mbai says a "soft, humane approach" contributed to the achievements — along with the Australian police training, equipment and assistance.

Once arrested, the challenge is to change a terrorist's ideology, he says. Aside from forbidding harsh interrogations, Indonesian authorities have been subsidising the families of convicted terrorists.

"We give the children assistance so they can return to school, we help the wife so she can survive and we are then able to communicate with the terrorists," Mbai says.

Religious leaders are also used to convince those captured that terrorism is not condoned by Islam, but the most effective persuaders are the terrorists' former leaders and trainers, he says.

The key weapon in Indonesia's "soft" war on terror is Nasir Abas, a personable man who trained most of JI's hardliners to kill.

When a terrorist is arrested, Abas is usually among the first to meet them. First there are reminiscences about times past, then offers of assistance. Some, including Dujana and Zarkasih, "are not too happy to see me", he says.

When he met one of Top's men, Cholily — who constructed a website detailing where foreigners could be ambushed and killed in Jakarta — Abas was told Top had vowed to shoot him on sight.

Abas says he always thought he was training men to protect an Islamic state, not kill civilians. Although Australian officials are paranoid about revealing the extent of technical and policing assistance to counter-terrorist operations in Indonesia, they are more forthcoming about Canberra's participation in the hearts-and-minds campaign towards Muslims.

Foreign Minister Alexander Downer told The Sunday Age moderate Islamic leaders must be encouraged and supported. Australia is working with mass Muslim groups across Indonesia, he says.

"They are the people who are going to confront extremist Islam," Mr Downer says. "We are actually building Islamic schools in Indonesia — we're building thousands of them, 2000 of them. Why? Because Islam is a fact."

Sidney Jones says more must be done to confront fundamentalist ideology. JI was born from another hardline Islamic group that waxed and waned for 50 years, similar to several existing today. The more than 20 schools it has established and the offspring of its members are fertile recruiting grounds. In prison, members use Islamic study groups to win across other inmates.

"The ideology now has deep roots in the region and you can't say the danger is over," she says.

Although JI has lost its base in Poso — where it attempted to inspire Islamic hatred of Christians — it retains an intricate web of family, business and social ties, providing the capacity to regenerate.

JI's new leaders will be Indonesia-focused, opposed to al-Qaeda-style tactics, says Jones, but some youths may grow impatient and radicals hiding in the Philippines could return to lead them.

In one post-arrest interview, Dujana pointed out that JI could not be understood as an organisation in conventional terms. "We are underground," he said. "What is clear is, we still have friends out there. God willing, they are patient."

How Jemaah Islamiah became the region's primary terrorist threat

Established in 1993 by two hardline Indonesian clerics, Abdullah Sungkar and Abu Bakar Bashir, who had fled to Malaysia.

The group dispatched fighters to Afghanistan, building strong links with Osama bin Laden's al-Qaeda, and developed its own military training bases in Indonesia and the Philippines.

With the aim of enforcing an Islamic state across the region, Jemaah Islamiah established four command structures, or mantiqis. Mantiqi 1 covered Malaysia, Singapore and southern Thailand. Mantiqi 2 covered Indonesia. Mantiqi 3 covered the Philippines, and Indonesia's Kalimantan and Sulawesi. Mantiqi 4 was to be responsible for Australia and West Papua.

Initially it concentrated its attacks on Christians and churches, but burst on to the international terror scene with the 2002 Bali bombing as the region's primary terrorist threat.

KEY EVENTS: Jemaah Islamiah founded.

■ 1993

December 24, 2000: Bombs sent to about 30 churches in Indonesia.

October 12, 2002. First Bali bombing.

August-September 2003. Captured Bali bombers Mukhlas, Imam Samudra and Amrozi sentenced to death.

April 30, 2004: Abu Bakar Bashir sentenced to 2½ years' jail for approving the Bali bombing (verdict overturned after his release).

September 9, 2004: Bombing of Australian Embassy, Jakarta.

October 1, 2005: Second Bali bombings.

November 9, 2005: Azahari Husin shot dead in Malang, East Java.

June 9, 2007: Abu Dujana (military commander) and Zarkasih (emir) arrested.

Dujana did admit to encouraging violence in Poso, including church bombings and the beheading of three Christian schoolgirls in 2005. As Poso was a "conflict zone" where Muslims were under attack he justified these attacks as jihad.

Revulsion at the beheadings drove a new police investigation into Poso, exposing JI's hand in the violence. Early this year, 22 sympathisers were killed when they resisted a police raid on a remote village. Others arrested revealed the location of JI's safe houses in Java. Watching them, along with monitoring phone and internet communications, led police to stockpiles of guns and hundreds of kilograms of explosives, then to Dujana and Zakarsih.

Indonesian Security Ministry counter-terrorism chief Ansyaad Mbai describes the operation as a "spectacular success, this network is the inner circle of JI".

In a swipe at those in the US and Australia who had claimed Indonesia was not tough enough against suspects and should have outlawed JI, Mbai says a "soft, humane approach" contributed to the achievements — along with the Australian police training, equipment and assistance.

Once arrested, the challenge is to change a terrorist's ideology, he says. Aside from forbidding harsh interrogations, Indonesian authorities have been subsidising the families of convicted terrorists.

"We give the children assistance so they can return to school, we help the wife so she can survive and we are then able to communicate with the terrorists," Mbai says.

Religious leaders are also used to convince those captured that terrorism is not condoned by Islam, but the most effective persuaders are the terrorists' former leaders and trainers, he says.

The key weapon in Indonesia's "soft" war on terror is Nasir Abas, a personable man who trained most of JI's hardliners to kill.

When a terrorist is arrested, Abas is usually among the first to meet them. First there are reminiscences about times past, then offers of assistance. Some, including Dujana and Zarkasih, "are not too happy to see me", he says.

When he met one of Top's men, Cholily — who constructed a website detailing where foreigners could be ambushed and killed in Jakarta — Abas was told Top had vowed to shoot him on sight.

Abas says he always thought he was training men to protect an Islamic state, not kill civilians. Although Australian officials are paranoid about revealing the extent of technical and policing assistance to counter-terrorist operations in Indonesia, they are more forthcoming about Canberra's participation in the hearts-and-minds campaign towards Muslims.

Foreign Minister Alexander Downer told The Sunday Age moderate Islamic leaders must be encouraged and supported. Australia is working with mass Muslim groups across Indonesia, he says.

"They are the people who are going to confront extremist Islam," Mr Downer says. "We are actually building Islamic schools in Indonesia — we're building thousands of them, 2000 of them. Why? Because Islam is a fact."

Sidney Jones says more must be done to confront fundamentalist ideology. JI was born from another hardline Islamic group that waxed and waned for 50 years, similar to several existing today. The more than 20 schools it has established and the offspring of its members are fertile recruiting grounds. In prison, members use Islamic study groups to win across other inmates.

"The ideology now has deep roots in the region and you can't say the danger is over," she says.

Although JI has lost its base in Poso — where it attempted to inspire Islamic hatred of Christians — it retains an intricate web of family, business and social ties, providing the capacity to regenerate.

JI's new leaders will be Indonesia-focused, opposed to al-Qaeda-style tactics, says Jones, but some youths may grow impatient and radicals hiding in the Philippines could return to lead them.

In one post-arrest interview, Dujana pointed out that JI could not be understood as an organisation in conventional terms. "We are underground," he said. "What is clear is, we still have friends out there. God willing, they are patient."

How Jemaah Islamiah became the region's primary terrorist threat

Established in 1993 by two hardline Indonesian clerics, Abdullah Sungkar and Abu Bakar Bashir, who had fled to Malaysia.

The group dispatched fighters to Afghanistan, building strong links with Osama bin Laden's al-Qaeda, and developed its own military training bases in Indonesia and the Philippines.

With the aim of enforcing an Islamic state across the region, Jemaah Islamiah established four command structures, or mantiqis. Mantiqi 1 covered Malaysia, Singapore and southern Thailand. Mantiqi 2 covered Indonesia. Mantiqi 3 covered the Philippines, and Indonesia's Kalimantan and Sulawesi. Mantiqi 4 was to be responsible for Australia and West Papua.

Initially it concentrated its attacks on Christians and churches, but burst on to the international terror scene with the 2002 Bali bombing as the region's primary terrorist threat.

KEY EVENTS: Jemaah Islamiah founded.

■ 1993

December 24, 2000: Bombs sent to about 30 churches in Indonesia.

October 12, 2002. First Bali bombing.

August-September 2003. Captured Bali bombers Mukhlas, Imam Samudra and Amrozi sentenced to death.

April 30, 2004: Abu Bakar Bashir sentenced to 2½ years' jail for approving the Bali bombing (verdict overturned after his release).

September 9, 2004: Bombing of Australian Embassy, Jakarta.

October 1, 2005: Second Bali bombings.

November 9, 2005: Azahari Husin shot dead in Malang, East Java.

June 9, 2007: Abu Dujana (military commander) and Zarkasih (emir) arrested.

It was Golose who captured the Bali bombers. And it was Golose who, after the second Bali attacks, ordered JI's master bomb-maker Azahari Husin to be cut down by a barrage of bullets in a village hideout before he could detonate the suicide bomb strapped to his chest.

He believes the terrorists are incapable, for now, of launching fresh attacks.

"Before we were afraid of them," he says. "Now they are afraid of us. We are not saying that they are stopped, but at least they need to consolidate. To hunt them is the best strategy. That's what we are doing now, hunting them."

Before 2002, JI bombed churches across Indonesia but police knew little about the network and had no idea where the next attack would be, Golose admits.

Now JI and its offshoots have been unable to mount a major attack for almost two years, he says. The mantiqis have been abandoned and leaders of its key remaining base in Indonesia's central Java are undergoing interrogation.

The International Crisis Group's Sidney Jones agrees that "JI has been severely weakened over the past five years in terms of geographic reach, funding, capacity and, importantly, control.

"In the near term, JI will be focused on rebuilding and remains dangerous less as a terrorist organisation in its own right than as a recruiting tool," she says.

Not that JI has conceded defeat.

Police interviews and seized documents reveal a plan to regroup and rebuild towards a 30-year goal of establishing an Islamic state, with a growing network of radical Islamic schools to nurse recruits.

JI's remaining leaders believe mass bombings — which killed more Muslims than Christians — and resulting crackdowns backfired and favour an evolutionary imposition of Islamic Sharia law.

A few fanatics, spearheaded by Bali bomb planner Noordin Top, remain dedicated to attacking civilians but are busy avoiding capture. Several hardliners have fled to the Philippines and teamed up with the Abu Sayyaf Group, but are distanced from the JI mainstream.

Following his arrest, Dujana admitted he headed JI's military wing, but claimed to oppose the Bali bombings. "Some of the perpetrators are JI members, however today they are out of control," Dujana said, adding that Top had violated JI's "rules of the game".

Golose remains sceptical, pointing out that Dujana received reports on the bombings, provided personnel and enabled Top to continue to evade capture.

Dujana did admit to encouraging violence in Poso, including church bombings and the beheading of three Christian schoolgirls in 2005. As Poso was a "conflict zone" where Muslims were under attack he justified these attacks as jihad.

Revulsion at the beheadings drove a new police investigation into Poso, exposing JI's hand in the violence. Early this year, 22 sympathisers were killed when they resisted a police raid on a remote village. Others arrested revealed the location of JI's safe houses in Java. Watching them, along with monitoring phone and internet communications, led police to stockpiles of guns and hundreds of kilograms of explosives, then to Dujana and Zakarsih.

Indonesian Security Ministry counter-terrorism chief Ansyaad Mbai describes the operation as a "spectacular success, this network is the inner circle of JI".

In a swipe at those in the US and Australia who had claimed Indonesia was not tough enough against suspects and should have outlawed JI, Mbai says a "soft, humane approach" contributed to the achievements — along with the Australian police training, equipment and assistance.

Once arrested, the challenge is to change a terrorist's ideology, he says. Aside from forbidding harsh interrogations, Indonesian authorities have been subsidising the families of convicted terrorists.

"We give the children assistance so they can return to school, we help the wife so she can survive and we are then able to communicate with the terrorists," Mbai says.

Religious leaders are also used to convince those captured that terrorism is not condoned by Islam, but the most effective persuaders are the terrorists' former leaders and trainers, he says.

The key weapon in Indonesia's "soft" war on terror is Nasir Abas, a personable man who trained most of JI's hardliners to kill.

When a terrorist is arrested, Abas is usually among the first to meet them. First there are reminiscences about times past, then offers of assistance. Some, including Dujana and Zarkasih, "are not too happy to see me", he says.

When he met one of Top's men, Cholily — who constructed a website detailing where foreigners could be ambushed and killed in Jakarta — Abas was told Top had vowed to shoot him on sight.

Abas says he always thought he was training men to protect an Islamic state, not kill civilians. Although Australian officials are paranoid about revealing the extent of technical and policing assistance to counter-terrorist operations in Indonesia, they are more forthcoming about Canberra's participation in the hearts-and-minds campaign towards Muslims.

Foreign Minister Alexander Downer told The Sunday Age moderate Islamic leaders must be encouraged and supported. Australia is working with mass Muslim groups across Indonesia, he says.

"They are the people who are going to confront extremist Islam," Mr Downer says. "We are actually building Islamic schools in Indonesia — we're building thousands of them, 2000 of them. Why? Because Islam is a fact."

Sidney Jones says more must be done to confront fundamentalist ideology. JI was born from another hardline Islamic group that waxed and waned for 50 years, similar to several existing today. The more than 20 schools it has established and the offspring of its members are fertile recruiting grounds. In prison, members use Islamic study groups to win across other inmates.

"The ideology now has deep roots in the region and you can't say the danger is over," she says.

Although JI has lost its base in Poso — where it attempted to inspire Islamic hatred of Christians — it retains an intricate web of family, business and social ties, providing the capacity to regenerate.

JI's new leaders will be Indonesia-focused, opposed to al-Qaeda-style tactics, says Jones, but some youths may grow impatient and radicals hiding in the Philippines could return to lead them.

In one post-arrest interview, Dujana pointed out that JI could not be understood as an organisation in conventional terms. "We are underground," he said. "What is clear is, we still have friends out there. God willing, they are patient."

How Jemaah Islamiah became the region's primary terrorist threat

Established in 1993 by two hardline Indonesian clerics, Abdullah Sungkar and Abu Bakar Bashir, who had fled to Malaysia.

The group dispatched fighters to Afghanistan, building strong links with Osama bin Laden's al-Qaeda, and developed its own military training bases in Indonesia and the Philippines.

With the aim of enforcing an Islamic state across the region, Jemaah Islamiah established four command structures, or mantiqis. Mantiqi 1 covered Malaysia, Singapore and southern Thailand. Mantiqi 2 covered Indonesia. Mantiqi 3 covered the Philippines, and Indonesia's Kalimantan and Sulawesi. Mantiqi 4 was to be responsible for Australia and West Papua.

Initially it concentrated its attacks on Christians and churches, but burst on to the international terror scene with the 2002 Bali bombing as the region's primary terrorist threat.

KEY EVENTS: Jemaah Islamiah founded.

■ 1993

December 24, 2000: Bombs sent to about 30 churches in Indonesia.

October 12, 2002. First Bali bombing.

August-September 2003. Captured Bali bombers Mukhlas, Imam Samudra and Amrozi sentenced to death.

April 30, 2004: Abu Bakar Bashir sentenced to 2½ years' jail for approving the Bali bombing (verdict overturned after his release).

September 9, 2004: Bombing of Australian Embassy, Jakarta.

October 1, 2005: Second Bali bombings.

November 9, 2005: Azahari Husin shot dead in Malang, East Java.

June 9, 2007: Abu Dujana (military commander) and Zarkasih (emir) arrested.

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